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The New Use of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability to Invalidate
Arbitration Agreements in Consumer
Contracts
Manfredi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield'
I. INTRODUCTION
Unconscionability was seldom a successful defense in the context of arbitra-
tion before the recent boom of arbitration agreement usage in the consumer con-
text. 2  Even when unconscionability was raised as a defense, the general belief
among practitioners was that such claims were rarely successful. However, as
the practice of including arbitration provisions in consumer contracts has expand-
ed, so has the number of unconscionability claims raised by unhappy consumers.4
The increase in the success of these claims speaks to a revived judicial hostility
toward arbitration5 which is in conflict with the United States Supreme Court's
stated preference for arbitrability.6
Manfredi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield suggests that this old judicial hostility
is alive and well in Missouri jurisprudence. In an effort to level the playing field
between parties of unequal bargaining power, Missouri courts have applied the
unconscionability doctrine as a way to sidestep the United States Supreme Court's
asserted policy favoring arbitration over litigation.7 This note considers the new
approach of Missouri courts in invalidating arbitration agreements through the
doctrine of unconscionability in the consumer context.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS),8 a healthcare insurance company, offers
service agreements to employers, group health care plans, and individuals for
1. 340 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
2. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionabilty,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004) (citing Joseph M. Pcnllo, Avoidance and Reformation, in 7 ARTHUR
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 29.4 (1962) (for the proposition that most claims of unconscionability fail)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. In comparing contract provisions in arbitration agreements to nonarbitration agreements,
Randall found that courts would uphold the same provision in a nonarbirtation agreement that it would
find unconscionable in an arbitration agreement. Id. at 197.
6. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1984); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Co., 103 S. Ct. 927, 14 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
7. See generally id.
8. BCBS is the largest healthcare benefits provider in the Kansas City area, serving more than
880,000 members, or 44% of the entire metropolitan population. Brief for Respondent at 7, Manfredi
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 340 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (No. WL71150).
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covered medical services.9 Plaintiff Dr. Ronald Manfredi, a licensed chiropractor,
has operated his chiropractic business in Raytown, Missouri since 1981.10
Manfredi signed his first service agreement with BCBS in 1986 and has continued
to act as a healthcare provider in the BCBS network ever since." In January
2002, Manfredi signed an Allied Provider Participation Agreement (the Agree-
ment) with BCBS.12 The Agreement, a form contract presented to Manfredi on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis,13 named the terms under which BCBS agreed to reim-
burse Manfredi for chiropractic services he provided to BCBS insured.14 The
Agreement also contained a mandatory arbitration clause that was not present in
the previous agreements executed by BCBS and Manfredi."
During the summer of 2004, BCBS notified healthcare providers, including
Manfredi, that as of August 1, 2004, it would cease providing coverage for Elec-
trical Stimulation Modalities (ESM) because it had reclassified ESM as an "inves-
tigational" treatment.16 Manfredi filed a petition for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against BCBS in the Circuit Court of Jackson County on October
17, 2005." Manfredi's petition argued that, under the Agreement, BCBS did not
possess the authority to remove coverage of services.18 As such, Manfredi asked
the court for an injunction to preclude the elimination of services previously cov-
ered by BCBS under the Agreement, and an order requiring that ESM be reinstat-
ed as a covered service. 19 Moreover, Manfredi asked the court to find as a matter
of law that the Agreement's arbitration clause was unconscionable and, thus, unen-
forceable.20 BCBS responded by filing an answer and a motion to compel arbitra-
tion of Manfredi's claims.21
A hearing was conducted, after which the circuit court denied BCBS's motion
to compel arbitration, and concluded that the arbitration clause was both proce-
durally and substantively unconscionable. 22 The court also found that, by failing
to satisfy the one-year deadline for pursuing arbitration included in the Agree-
ment, BCBS had waived its right to arbitration.23
9. Brief for Appellant at 3, Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 340 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2011) (No. WD71150). Covered services are defined by BCBS. Id.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. Healthcare providers participate in activities such as billing, compensation, and rate arrange-
ments with BCBS, and agree to treat those insured by BCBS at an agreed on "participating provider"
rate. Id.
12. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 129.
13. Id. at 133. A contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis refers to the idea that a party has
little or no possibility of negotiating any of the terms.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. EMS is used as treatment for pain management and musculoskeletal disorders. Id. at 130.
17. Id. at 129-130.




22. Id. Procedural unconscionability refers to the formalities of creating an agreement while sub-
stantive unconscionability refers to undue harshness in the terms of the agreement. Id. at 132. In Mis-
souri, there generally must be aspects of both procedural and substantive unconscionability for a con-
tract or clause to be voided, however more of one will lessen the amount needed of the other. Whitney
v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).
23. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 130.
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BCBS brought an interlocutory appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District challenging the trial court's denial of its motion to compel
arbitration. 24 BCBS argued five main points on appeal. First, BCBS asserted that
Manfredi's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause because the lan-
guage of the arbitration clause was broad and encompassed Manfredi's claims. 25
In its second and third points, BCBS contended that the trial court erred in finding
the presence of procedural and substantive unconscionability by arguing the use of
a form contract and lack of negotiation did not create automatic procedural uncon-
scionability and also that the arbitration clause was not hidden in the agreement.26
In its fourth point, BCBS argued that the trial court erred by invalidating the entire
arbitration clause instead of severing the offending provisions.27 Finally, BCBS
28
argued it had not waived its right to pursue arbitration under the Agreement.
With regard to BCBS's first point, the majority found that Manfredi's petition
did not raise the issue of scope, and thus the parties effectively conceded that the
issues were within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 29 As to BCBS's second
and third points, the appellate court noted the arbitration provision allowed BCBS
to unilaterally alter or avoid the arbitration procedures, precluded review of a
certain class of disputes, unfairly favored BCBS, and greatly limited the arbitra-
tor's power in granting awards. As such, the court found the contract offered
Manfredi no real remedies, and was, thus, both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. 30 Accordingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District affirmed the holdings of the circuit court, ' finding the arbitration clause
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and, thus, wholly unenforceable. 32
III. LEGAL HISTORY
As to matters of substantive law, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)33 pro-
vides that when a contract relates to interstate commerce, the FAA preempts the
Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA). 34 Although the FAA states that valid
arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforced unless a
valid exception applies,35 state law contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and
unconscionability may be used to invalidate such arbitration agreements without
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 133.
27. Id. at 135.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 132. Manfredi's petition did not assert that the issues he complained of were not within the
scope of the arbitration Agreement. Id.; but see id. at 136 (Welsh, J. concurring) (arguing that he would
have found the issues outside the scope of the agreement and would have upheld the lower court with-
out further inquiry).
30. Id. at 134-35.
31. The case was decided, and the opinion filed, on February 22, 2011.
32. Id. Having concluded that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and should be struck in
its entirety, the court found the provision was not severable, and did not address the effect of one year
time limitation in the Agreement. Id.
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
34 See MUAA Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2000); see also Scharf v. Kogan, 285 S.W.3d 362, 369
(Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
35. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 20 (Mo. Banc 2010).
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contravening the FAA.36 This section will address the recent history of Missouri's
unconscionability analysis regarding arbitration agreements and examine Mis-
souri's interpretation concerning the scope of arbitration clauses.
A. Unconscionability
Missouri has generally defined unconscionability as "an inequality so strong,
gross and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with common sense
without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it."37 Unconscionability is
determined from the time the contract is executed and not thereafter.38 In Mis-
souri, unconscionability may be procedural, substantive, or a combination of
both. Procedural unconscionability refers to the contract formation process,
centering on the "high pressure exerted on the parties, fine print of the contract,
misrepresentation, or unequal bargaining position."40 Substantive unconscionabil-
ity refers to undue harshness present in the contract terms.41 Although most states
require a showing of both types of unconscionability for a court to void a contract
provision, Missouri requires only a showing of one type to invalidate a contract
42provision.
Until the 1980s, courts historically looked unkindly on arbitration as a meth-
od for resolving nonlabor disputes. 43 This reality has been acknowledged several
times by the United States Supreme Court. 4 In response to this judicial disap-
proval, Congress passed the FAA in an effort to promote court enforcement of
arbitration agreements.45 Missouri's history of finding contracts invalid due to
unconscionability is not terribly substantial, and, prior to 2005, there is scarcely
little history of finding arbitration provisions unenforceable solely on that
ground.46 This resurgence of using unconscionability as a ground for invaliding
arbitration provisions is not limited to Missouri courts, but has been observed
across the nation.47 A variety of reasons could explain some of the growth of
36. Swain v. Auto Scrvs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).
37. See State, Mo. Dcpt. of Soc. Scrv., Div. of Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc., 50 S.W.3d
273, 277 (Mo. 2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981)).
38. Richardson v. Richardson, 218 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Mo. 2007).
39. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 340 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (citing
Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 22).
40. Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Mo. App. W D. 2005).
4 1. Id.
42. See generally Ruhl v. Lec's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2010).
43. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:11 (4th ed.).
44. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryslcr-
Plymoth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
45. Id. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 (1967).
46. This information is based on scarches of LexisNexis and Westlaw performed on October 23,
2011 by the author; see also Spraguc v. Household Int'l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (Mo. W.D. 2005)
(noting Missouri cases "give little guidance on the subject of unconscionability." Bracey v. Monsanto
Co. 823 S.W.2d 946,949 (Mo. 1992)).
47. Randall, supra note 2, at 194-95. Randall's rescarch found that in 2002-2003, litigants uncon-
scionability in 235 cases, and courts found contracts or clauses unconscionable in 100 of those cases,
or 42.5%. She also found that of those 235 cases, 161, or 68.5%, involved arbitration agreements and
that courts found 50.3% of the arbitration agreements unconscionable, as opposed to 25.6% of other
types of contracts. Id. Randall also noted that twenty years prior, courts held 12.5% of the arbitration
320 [Vol. 2012
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unconscionability findings by courts, such as an increase in litigation and stronger
drafting of arbitration agreements. 48 Yet, as some commentators have pointed out,
greater judicial readiness to declare arbitration agreements unconscionable implies
a degree of underlying judicial hostility toward arbitration.49
The use of unconscionability as a basis for invalidating an arbitration provi-
sion in Missouri was foreshadowed in the 2003 opinion in Swain v. Auto Services,
Inc., 5 where the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District addressed
unconscionability as it applied to adhesion contracts containing arbitration provi-
sions. Mr. Swain bought a car from a dealer and also bought a car service plan
from Auto Services.5 1 After Auto Services declined to pay for certain repairs, Mr.
Swain filed a petition challenging the enforceability of the arbitration provision in
the agreement based on unconscionability and adhesion.52 Auto Services moved
to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied its motion, instead holding that the
provision was unconscionable.53 While the appellate court found the contract was
obviously one of adhesion, it determined the arbitration clause was not uncon-
scionable because the arbitration provision was clearly stated in the contract such
that a reasonable person would expect to arbitrate disputes when signing such an
agreement.54 Further, the court stated that an agreement that chose arbitration
over litigation was not unconscionable, notwithstanding the fact the parties main-
tained uneven bargaining power.55  Although the court ultimately rejected the
argument that the arbitration clause was invalid due to unconscionability, the deci-
sion laid the groundwork for courts to begin to consider unconscionability as a
basis for finding arbitration clauses unenforceable in the consumer context.
One of the first Missouri cases to advocate this new way of thinking was the
2005 case of Whitney v. Alitel Communications, Inc.56 Mr. Whitney had been an
Alltel customer for seven years when he filed a class action suit against Alltel for
including a small charge disguised as a government tax.57 Alltel filed a motion to
compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause included in the agreement be-
tween the parties, but the motion was denied after the trial court held that the arbi-
tration clause was unconscionable.s5  On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Western District determined that the contract was one of adhesion, but in
following the analysis first articulated in Swain, found that adhesion was not
agreements, as compared to 15.2% of other types of contracts, unconscionable. Id. at 196. This re-
search led to Randall's conclusion that twenty years prior, courts were somewhat less likely to find
arbitration agreements unconscionable than nonarbitration agreements while in 2002-2003, courts
found arbitration agreements unconscionable twice as often as other categories of contracts. Id. at 196.
48. ATFORNEY'S PRACTICE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS (SECOND) § 22:5 (citing Randall, supra note 2,
at 197).
49. Id; see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1421-22 (2008); Sandra F. Gavin,
Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 249, 251-52 (2006).
50. Swain v. Auto Scrys., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).
51. Id. at 105.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 105-06.
54. Id. at 107-108.
55. Id. at 108.
56. Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 300 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).
57. Id. at 304.
58. Id. at 304-05
No. 1] 321
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enough to invalidate the arbitration provision.59 Relying heavily on precedent
from other states,60 the court found unconscionability to exist,6' due largely to the
unequal bargaining power of the parties and the lack of negotiation between the
parties. 62 As such, the court invalidated the arbitration provision.63 This decision
invited Missouri courts to begin invalidating arbitration agreements in the con-
sumer context on the basis of the unconscionability doctrine. 4
In 2009, four years after Whitney, the Missouri Supreme Court in Brewer v.
Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 65 found an arbitration provision in a consumer contract
unconscionable and thus, unenforceable. Ms. Brewer borrowed $2,215 from
Missouri Title Loans (MTL) to purchase an automobile.67  Ms. Brewer alleged
that her agreement with MTL violated state law and filed a class action petition in
circuit court. 8 MTL moved to compel arbitration per the agreement.6 The trial
court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that the class arbitration waiver in
the loan agreement was unconscionable and could not be enforced. 70 The Mis-
souri Supreme Court affirmed the findings of unconscionability7 1 and reinforced
Missouri's new proclivity for invalidating arbitration provisions on this ground.
B. The Scope
The FAA has been interpreted by Missouri courts to convey a policy of pref-
erence for finding arbitration agreements enforceable. 72  However, it has been
59. Id. at 310-11.
60. Id at 311. The two most influential cases for the Whitney court included the Alabama case of
Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So.2d 529 (Ala. 2002) and the Florida case of Powertel, Inc. v.
Bexley, 743 So.2d 570 (Fla. App. 1999), both of which held that the arbitration provisions were un-
conscionable.
61. Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 310. The court found procedural unconscionability in that the contract
provisions were presented on a take-it-or-lcave-it basis, unequal bargaining power between the parties,
lack of negotiation, and the provision was in hidden in the fine print of the agreement. Id. at 314 The
court also found substantive unconscionability because it would be impractical to bring the small
claims as individual arbitration disputes and the customer would bear all costs of arbitration, which in
light of the small potential recovery, Alltel was basically immunized from liability. Id.
62 Id. at 310.
63. Id.
64. See Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. Banc 2010); Brewer v. Missouri Title
Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. Banc 2010); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556
(Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009);
Woods v. Q.C. Financial Services, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. App. E D. 2008); Morrow v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).
65. 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. Banc 2009). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacat-
ed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc. on May 2, 2011, and
remanded the case to the Missouri Supreme Court for consideration after the decision handed down in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). As of the submission date of this note
for publication, the Missouri Supreme Court had not ruled on Brewer on remand.
66. Id. at 23




71. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. Banc 2010).
72. Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Scrv., 261 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008);
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suggested that this preference, alone, is not sufficient to expand an arbitration
agreement outside its intended scope.73 As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court,
"a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate unless the party has agreed to do so."
Missouri courts have recognized this dominant presumption in support of arbitra-
bility, and that any dispute that "touches the matters covered by the parties' con-
tract" should be ordered to arbitration if possible.75
In construing arbitration agreements, Missouri courts have classified such
agreements as "broad" or "narrow."76 A broad arbitration clause includes all dis-
putes arising from an arbitration contract, while a narrow clause limits arbitration
to particular categories of disputes.77  Missouri has tended toward interpreting
arbitration clauses more broadly.7 8
In 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District illustrated
this approach in Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Services,79 when
interpreting the scope of an arbitration provision and what it considered to "touch
the matters covered by the parties' contract."so The plaintiffs, Kansas City area
physicians and medical organizations, entered into insurance contracts containing
arbitration clauses with the defendants, United Healthcare and Blue Cross Blue
Shield.8 ' The plaintiffs filed a petition claiming the defendants had joined togeth-
er in a price fixing and monopolization scheme in violation of state antitrust stat-
utes. 82 The defendants moved to compel arbitration of the claims.83  The trial
court held the antitrust claims were not within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment and consequently denied the defendants' motion.8 On appeal, the appellate
court broadly interpreted the arbitration agreement.8 5  Thus, while the plaintiffs
could maintain their action without reference to the underlying contracts, the court
held the plaintiffs' allegations did touch matters covered in the contracts between
the parties.86 The court found the plaintiffs' were seeking damages due to the
defendants' alleged conspiracy, which were damages the plaintiffs would not have
73. Kansas City Urology, 261 S.W.3d at I .
74. Id.
75. Ruhl v. Lec's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Mo. Banc 2010).
76. Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. 2003).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 428.
79. Kansas City Urology, 261 S.W.3d at 7.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 10-11. The plaintiffs signed one of five types of arbitration agreements with the defendants
which can be divided into two categories. The first category made no mention to the underlying reim-
bursement contracts and broadly said that the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes that arose be-
tween them. These agreements included language such as "if one of [the parties] does not agree with
an action taken by the other[.]"; "Any and all disputes between them . . . including but not limited to
all questions of arbitrability, the existence, validity, scope or termination of the Agreement or any term
thereof."; and "any disputes about their business relationship." The second category referred to the
underlying reimbursement contracts. These agreements included language such as "dispute . . . relat-
ing to or arising from this Agreement[.]"; and others mandated that the parties arbitrate any dispute
which arose out of or was "related to this Agreement." Id. at I1.
82. Id. at 10-11.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 13.
No. 1]1 323
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experienced but for their entering into contracts with the defendants.8 7 Therefore
the plaintiffs' antitrust claims touched matters covered by the agreements.8
In the 2010 opinion of Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda,89 the Missouri Supreme
Court again took a broad view of the scope of the arbitration agreement. Ms. Ruhl
bought and financed a new car from Honda and signed a retail purchase agree-
ment which contained an arbitration clause and waiver to participate in a class
action.90 Ms. Ruh1 brought suit against Honda on behalf of herself and two others
for fees charged. 91 Honda filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims which
the trial court denied, on the basis that those claims were outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement based on the particular language of the agreement. 92 On
appeal, Honda argued that Ms. Ruhl's claims were within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement and the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
agreed. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Ms. Ruth's claims
rested on the allegation that Honda was charging unlawful processing fees and
thus whatever damages Ms. Ruhl might be awarded would be based on the fee
charged under the contract.94 The court held that this placed Ms. Ruhl's claim
squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement.9 5 Missouri precedent illus-
trates a preference for an expansive interpretation of the scope of arbitration




In a unanimous decision, the Manfredi court addressed BCBS's appeal of the
denial of its motion to compel arbitration.9 7 As noted by the court, when a con-
tract concerns interstate commerce, as this contract did, the FAA normally
preempts the MUAA for issues involving substantive law.98 However, state law
contract defenses such as unconscionability, fraud, and duress, have the power to
invalidate arbitration agreements without breaching the mandates of the FAA.99
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
89. 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. Banc 2010).
90. Id. at 138.
91. Id.
92. Id. (finding the claim involving Honda's unauthorized practice of law not subject to arbitration
because it involved an issue exclusively left to the courts to decide).
93. Ruhl v. Lec's Summit Honda, No. WD 70189,2009 WL 3571309 at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
94. Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Mo. Banc 2010).
95. Id. at 139.
96. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) ("To confine the scope of the [FAA] to
arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended
to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.").
97. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 340 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
98. Id. at 130 (citing Scharf v. Kogan, 285 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) ("Section I of the
FFA provides that valid arbitration agreements that affect interstate commerce must be enforced unless
an exception applies.") (citing Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 20 (Mo. Banc
2010)).
99. Id. (citing Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003)).
[Vol. 2012324
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After these observations, the court then began a point-by-point analysis of
BCBS's arguments on appeal.
BCBS first contended that Manfredi's claims fell within the scope of the arbi-
tration clause because the language of that clause was broad enough to cover those
claims.'00 Addressing this argument, the court observed that there "is a strong
presumption in favor of arbitrability," and, when an arbitration clause is expan-
sive, that the trial court should require arbitration whenever possible.' 1 In apply-
ing that proposition to the case, the court noted that the Agreement between the
parties was not only broad, but exceedingly so, in that it attempted to include any
unsettled dispute that might arise.102 However, the court recognized that a vital
part of analyzing the scope of any arbitration agreement includes a determination
of whether any exclusions or exceptions are present in the agreement to limit the
scope. 0 3 To that end, the court found the Agreement in this case put considerable
limitations on the arbitration process.
The Western District Court focused on one such limitation, which, while
seemingly meant to restrict the broad clause, essentially functioned to eliminate an
entire important category from the arbitration agreement.105 The Agreement pro-
vided that where the "disputed decision involved the discretion or medical judg-
ment of one party, the arbitrators could not disturb that decision or determina-
tion"; thus, the arbitrators could not arbitrate any disputed discretionary judg-
ments.106 The majority held this exclusion to be almost as broad as the agreement
to arbitrate itself, since all such disputes were considered outside the scope of the
Agreement.10 7 The court determined that if BCBS were able to use its discretion
to reclassify formerly accepted treatments as experimental, any dispute arising
from its decision was outside the scope of the Agreement and could be brought in
court.108 However, the court found that Manfredi never raised a scope argument
beyond a tenuous reference to scope in alleging a breach of duty of good faith.'
Accordingly, because neither party raised scope as an issue, the Western District
Court held the parties "effectively conceded" the dispute was inside the scope of
the Agreement.' 10 Thus, the majority assumed, for the purpose of the appeal, that
the issues were within the scope."
Having determined that the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, the court then turned to what it perceived as the procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable aspects of the Agreement between Manfredi and
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Ruhi v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Mo. Banc 2010)).
102. Id. at 13 1. The Agreement stated that if a dispute arose between the parties, "if ... the dispute
remains unresolved, the parties agree that they shall engage in binding arbitration in lieu of pursuing a







109. Id. at 131-132. There was disagreement among the majority as discussed supra note 127.
110 Id.at132.
Ill. Id. at 136. The court noted that the trial court did not make any express findings to the contrary.
Id. Judge Welsh's concurrence disagreed with the majonty on this point, determining that the dispute
was outside the scope and thus dispositive. Id.
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BCBS.12 Citing Brewer".. for the proposition that an unconscionable arbitration
provision in a contract will not be enforced,1 4 the majority noted that the overall
degree of procedural and substantive unconscionability should be considered to-
gether to decide whether an arbitration clause is generally unconscionable." 5
As to procedural unconscionability, the court found several factors in favor of
finding the Agreement procedurally unconscionable." 6  The Agreement was a
standardized form contract with non-negotiable terms which was presented to
Manfredi on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and there was a significant disparity in
bargaining power.' BCBS argued that a pre-printed contract and lack of negotia-
tion were not always procedurally unconscionable, and that the arbitration clause
was not unconscionably hidden." 8  The Western District rejected this argument
and found the level of procedural unconscionability present meant that the
Agreement could only be characterized as a contract of adhesion." 9
The majority stated that merely including a general arbitration agreement in a
contract of adhesion did not by itself require voiding the arbitration clause under
the FAA,120 but clauses that are substantively unconscionable in such an agree-
ment could make mandatory arbitration unconscionable.' 21 The court found that
the substantive provisions adjusting and limiting the arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties were plainly unconscionable because they gave BCBS "unfet-
tered discretion to create, control and alter the arbitration process." 22 Moreover,
the majority observed that the Agreement precluded review of a certain class of
disputes which unfairly favored BCBS.123 With regard to disputes involving dis-
cretion or medical judgments, the Western District found the arbitration agree-
ment illusory since the Agreement required arbitration of all disputes, yet elimi-
nated the power of arbitrators review this category of disputes.' 24
112. Id. at 132.
113. 323 S.W.3d 18,22 (Mo. Banc 2010).
114. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 132.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. Banc 2010)).
117. Id. at 132-133. BCBS was the largest health insurer for more than 44% of the population of the
Kansas City area and Manfredi was one of 3000 non-physician healthcare providers in the area. Id. at
133.
118. Id.
119. Id. (According to the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Vincent, 194 S.W.3d at 857, "a
contract of adhesion . . . [i]s a form contract that is created and imposed by the party with greater
bargaining power. . . .").
120. Id. (citing Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005)).
121. Id.
122. Id at 134. (Paragraphs 9.6 and 9.61 of the Agreement provides: "In the event of a dispute be-
tween [BSBC] and Allied Provider, the parties agree that they shall abide by the procedures, processes
and remedies set forth in this Agreement or otherwise established by BCBS for disputes of that type ...
[The dispute] shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association or other national ADR association acceptable to [BCBS]." (emphasis in origi-
nal); Paragraph 8.1 further provides: "Except as specified herein, this Agreement or an Addendum or
Attachment may be amended by [BCBS] upon ninety (90) days prior written notice to Allied Provid-
er.")
123. Id.
124. Id. The agreement also provided that arbitrators did not have the power to award consequential,
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The majority noted that the Agreement effectively gave BCBS immunity for
reprehensible behavior in proclaiming treatments medically unnecessary, or in re-
classifying them as experimental, and, thus not subject to reimbursement. 25 Fur-
thermore, the Western District determined that the limitations on the arbitrators'
power precluded arbitration from granting any real remedy to possible complain-
ants.126 Citing Brewer again, this time for the proposition that "when the practical
effect of forcing a case to arbitration would be to deny the injured party a remedy,
requiring the case to be arbitrated is unconscionable,"l 27 the court declared that the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable. 128
BCBS next argued that if there were unconscionable provisions in the con-
tract, those provisions should be severed and arbitration should be ordered as if
the offending provisions did not exist.129 The court stated that whether a contract
provision is severable depended on the particular circumstances of the case, and is
primarily an inquiry of the parties' intent.130 Applying this principle, the court
declared that, given the totality of the circumstances and lack of intent on the part
of Manfredi, the arbitration provision was unconscionable as a whole and could
not be severed.13'
The court upheld the trial court's determination that the arbitration agreement
was unconscionable and affirmed its denial of BCBS's motion to compel arbitra-
tion.132 The court struck the arbitration agreement in its entirety and instructed
that the case continue to litigation.
B. Judge Welsh's Concurrence
Judge Welsh, finding the scope issue dispositive, began his concurrence by
citing the arbitration agreement's exclusion of disputes resulting from either par-
ty's use of discretion or medical judgment.134 He stated that this provision put the
parties' dispute outside of the scope of the arbitration agreement and that the trial
court's decision should be affirmed without reaching the issue of unconscionabil-
ity. 135
125. Id. at 135.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 21-22 (Mo. Banc 2010)).
128. Id. The court considered the totality of the procedural and substantive characteristics present in
the agreement in reaching its conclusion. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Shaffcr v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)).
131. Id. The court again noted that they were dealing with a contract of adhesion that had aspects of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
132. Id.
133. The court did not reach BCBS's final point on appeal, which argued that the trial court crrcd in
finding that BCBS had waived its right to engage in arbitration because it had not begun arbitration
within the time limit provided in the Agreement. The court concluded that because the entire arbitra-
tion provision was unconscionable and unenforceable in its entirety, the court did not need to address
BCBS's final objection to the trial court's ruling that it had waived its right to arbitration for failing to
have begun arbitration within the time frame provided for in the agreement. Id.
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Judge Welsh found the dispute in this case to be an issue of discretion or
medical judgment of BCBS.136  He interpreted the Agreement to only obligate
BCBS to reimburse Manfredi for covered services, which included only medically
necessary services that were "essential to the health of the Covered Individual for
the diagnosis or care and treatment of a medical or surgical condition."' 3 ' The
Agreement also provided that "a BCBS medical director or his/her authorized
physician designee is the only person who may make a determination that a ser-
vice or supply is not Medically Necessary."' 3 8 By applying these provisions to the
facts, Judge Welsh found that, because BCBS's decision to reclassify electrical
stimulation modalities was based on its determination that the treatment was not
medically necessary, the limitation on arbitrators to decide issues involving dis-
cretion or medical judgment effectively removed the dispute from the scope of the
arbitration provision.139 Judge Welsh stated that the majority acknowledged this
dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement when it recognized that the prac-
tical effect of this limitation removed this class of disputes from the scope.140
Judge Welsh further asserted that, because the parties did not contract to re-
solve disputes arising from the use of discretion by means of arbitration, the court
could not compel the parties to do so.' 4 ' He suggested the majority was avoiding
this simple result by determining that Manfredi did not argue the dispute was out-
side the scope of the Agreement and that the trial court did not rule on the scope
issue.142 Furthermore, Judge Welsh argued the majority disregarded its stated
standard of review, and that the majority was "concerned primarily with the cor-
rectness of the trial court's result, not the route taken by the trial court to reach
that result."l143 Finding no significance in whether the scope was decided in the
lower court or argued in this court, Judge Welsh asserted the issue was plain on
the face of the record and thus dispositive.'4
As a result of Judge Welsh's conclusion that the scope issue was dispositive,
he found any discussion concerning unconscionability to be unnecessary, but con-
curred in the decision that the motion to compel arbitration was properly de-
nied.145
C. Judge Ahuja's Concurrence
Judge Ahuja began his concurrence by noting that it was entirely plausible to
construe the Agreement's scope provision to exclude disputes such as the one in
136. Id.
137. Id. To be considered a medically necessary service, the service was required to be "consistent
with acceptable medical practice according to the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association's




141. Id. at 137 (citing Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010) for
the proposition that absent an agreement to arbitrate, arbitration could not be compelled).
142. Id.
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this case, just as Judge Welsh and the majority recognized.14 6 However, Judge
Ahuja argued that the scope provision could also be construed as a constraint on
the arbitrator's remedial power, instead of a limit on the types of disputes covered
by the arbitration clause.147 According to Judge Ahuja, if that interpretation were
accepted, affirming the trial court's ruling would still be required due to BCBS's
obligation to exercise discretion in good faith.148
Judge Ahuja noted that numerous Missouri decisions have held arbitration
clauses that immunize a contracting party from liability for material breaches of
contractual duties are substantively unconscionable.149 He argued that this would
be the effect in this case if the discretionary limitation were construed to immun-
ize BCBS from liability for its bad-faith utilization of discretion or medical judg-
ment.15 0 According to Judge Ahuja, disputes over discretionary decisions almost
certainly comprise a large portion of potential disputes between the parties.' 5 '
Given the pivotal role in discretionary determinations in the parties' relationship,
Judge Ahuja concluded that any provision that effectively denied a party "any
remedy for the other party's abuse of its contractual authority" was oppressive,152
and inconsistent with reasonable expectations of the parties.' 53 According to
Judge Ahuja, this rendered the agreement unenforceable.154
Judge Ahuja concurred in the result that the circuit court properly refused to
compel arbitration.' 5 5  Whether that conclusion was based on a finding that
Manfredi's claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause, as Judge Welsh
asserted, or that the clause denied Manfredi any remedy for claims arising from
discretionary determinations by immunizing BSBC from liability, Judge Ahuja
found the result reached by the lower court to be correct. 5 6
IV. COMMENT
Manfredi is an example of the recent attitude shift occurring in Missouri
courts toward overturning arbitration agreements in the consumer context. While
the Manfredi court was presented with a simple way of invalidating the arbitration
clause by merely finding the dispute outside the scope of the agreement, the court
nonetheless held the entire agreement unconscionable and unenforceable in a thin-
ly veiled effort to avoid FAA preemption. Although unconscionability is a valid
146. Id. Judge Ahuja agreed with Judge Welsh that if the agreement did exclude such disputes, the
tnal court had no power to compel arbitration and its refusal to do so had to be affirmed. Id. at 137-38.
147. Id.
148. Id. "Missouri law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract." Farmers'
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Missouri Dept. of Corrs., 977 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Mo. Banc 1998).
149. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 136. See, e.g., Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18
(Mo. Banc 2010); Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. Banc 2010); Shaffer v. Royal
Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); and Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173
S.W.3d 300 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).
150. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 136.
151. Id. at 138-139. The trial court and majority noted that this discretionary class of disputes covers
a significant share of the disputes that may take place between the parties. Id. at 134.
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state law contract defense in numerous circumstances, it has developed into a
convenient tool for state courts to sidestep the FAA's preemption in areas affect-
ing interstate commerce,' and is contrary to the Supreme Court's communicated
preference for arbitrability. 5 8 This shift seems unwise given the advantages arbi-
tration agreements offer to both parties, such as efficiency, economy, and priva-
cy.159
Missouri courts claim to adhere to the view that an arbitration clause should
be construed in favor of arbitrability, and unless there is "positive assurance" that
a dispute is not covered by the arbitration provision, an arbitration provision
should be enforced.'60 Nonetheless, while the Manfredi court admitted the dispute
would normally be considered outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, it
undertook an artificial and unnecessary approach to avoid finding this issue dis-
positive. Relying solely on what it considered Manfredi's insufficient petition, the
majority held the scope issue was not sufficiently raised and, therefore, the trial
court ruling would have to be affirmed on other grounds.16 1 Judge Welsh's con-
currence criticized the majority for concentrating on what he argued was an un-
necessary discussion of unconscionability to arrive at a result that easily could
have been reached without it.162 As Judge Welsh pointed out, an appellate court
should be concerned first and foremost with whether a lower court's decision is
correct, not the method the lower court employed to reach it.163
The Manfredi court found evidence of both types of unconscionability in the
arbitration agreement at issue, largely due to its perception of inequality between
the parties. While the majority pointed to several factors it considered unfair to
Manfredi,'" it overvalued its determination that the contract was one of adhe-
sion,i16 especially in light of the clear precedent that an adhesion contract is not a
basis for automatic invalidation of an arbitration provision.'" This raises the ques-
tion of why the Manfredi court chose to void the provision in this way when it was
unnecessary to accomplish their preferred result of unenforceability. The answer
to this question may lie in the judges' personal feelings of fairness, and their per-
ceptions that fairness was not being served by BCBS's use of arbitration in its
agreement with Manfredi.
157. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
158. Id. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). The court described
section 2 of the FAA as implicating a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," and the "fundamen-
tal principle that arbitration is a matter of contract." Id.
159. Joyce J. George, The Advantages of Administered Arbitration When Going It Alone Just Won't
Do, DisP. RESOL. J. Aug-Oct. 2002, at 66 (2002) (noting the cost and time savings arbitration provides
as well as the ability for parties to structure the process governing their disputes).
160. JBS Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Agribusiness, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006).
161. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 132.
162. Id. at 137.
163. Id.; see also Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am. v. Graham, 984 S.W.2d 501, 506 (Mo. Banc
1999).
164. The form agreement was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, there existed unequal bargaining
power between the parties, BCBS controlled a significant portion of the relevant market, the terms
were not negotiated, and Manfredi's statements in his affidavit that he could not afford to reject the
agreement. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 132-133.
165. Id. at 133.
166. Id.; see also Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107-108 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).
[Vol. 2012330
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Missouri courts seem to have lost sight of the fact that arbitration results from
both parties' acceptance of the agreement, entered into voluntarily and by mutual
assent.167 By using unconscionability as a basis for invalidation as opposed to
scope, the court seemed to be sending a message that requiring consumers to arbi-
trate will not be met with blanket approval in Missouri. However, courts should
consider whether it is wise to continue this policy of consumer protection it has
seemingly adopted. The decision to disregard a competent consumer's choice to
enter an agreement containing an arbitration provision, and, thus, to take ad-
vantage of the accompanying benefits the arbitration process has to offer, should
not be made lightly. 16 8 If a particular case truly warrants invalidation for uncon-
scionability, an adjudicating court should adhere to the original meaning of this
doctrine and not resort to treating arbitration agreements as a specific category
singled out for disparate treatment.
Several recent decisions by Missouri courts have invalidated arbitration
clauses on the basis of unconscionability.' 69 This can be seen as an apparent man-
ifestation of Missouri courts' reluctance to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer
situations, especially when the contracts at issue are classified as adhesion. While
the MUAA states that all contracts of adhesion are exempted from the normal rule
that a written provision or agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising between the
parties is enforceable,'70 the FAA has no such exception."' Because the FAA
preempts the MUAA in all agreements involving interstate commerce, as almost
all consumer contracts do, this preemption renders the MUAA exception power-
less in most situations. However, as often cited by Missouri courts, the "generally
applicable state law contract defenses, such as fraud, duress and unconscionabil-
ity, may be used to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening the
FAA." 72 Missouri courts appear to possess a certain preference for finding arbi-
tration provisions unconscionable when applying Missouri substantive contract
law to an arbitration provision in a contract of adhesion, which, as Missouri courts
have repeatedly pointed out, is permitted under the FAA.
The United States Supreme Court has often reaffirmed the federal policy fa-
voring arbitration 73 and has emphasized that courts may not use unconscionabil-
ity as a means of treating arbitration agreements differently than other agreements.
167. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:11 (4th ed.).
168. See Jean R. Stcmlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN L. REV. 1631,
1636 (2005) (noting that courts have "always supported the use of voluntary binding arbitration ...
[and] . . . historically enforced arbitral awards and postdispute agreements to arbitrate . . . [and] the
passage of the FAA ... has required US courts to grant motions to compel arbitration to such agree-
ments.")
169. See Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. Banc 2010); Brewer v. Missouri Title
Loans, Inc., 323 S.W 3d 18 (Mo. Banc 2010); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556
(Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009);
Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Morrow v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300
(Mo. App. W.D. 2005); and Swain, 128 S.W.3d 103.
170. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2000).
171. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2000) with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
172. Whitney, 173, S.W.3d at 308.
173. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration. Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. OlsP. RESOL. 469, 476 (2006) (citing Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (noting the United States Supreme
Court's announcement of a federal policy favoring arbitration)).
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Rather, courts should regard arbitration agreements as being "upon the same foot-
ing as other contracts." 74 As recently stated in AT&T v. Concepcion, when a
generally applicable state-law doctrine such as unconscionability is applied in way
that seems hostile to arbitration, the FAA's preemptive quality may extend to
"grounds traditionally thought to exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."l 75
It appears the United States Supreme Court was responding to the tendency of
state courts to employ state-law contract defenses to avoid enforcing arbitration
clauses where state courts perceive unfairness in agreements.' 76 Yet this recogni-
tion has not deterred state courts, including Missouri, from employing uncon-
scionability to this end.'7 7  Time will tell whether the United States Supreme
Court, or perhaps the United States Congress, will step in to rectify this situation.
In the meantime it appears Missouri courts are not backing down from their use of
the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration provisions offensive to
judges' personal notions of fairness. This approach is unwise in an already-
clogged judicial system and evinces disregard for the personal autonomy of con-
sumers in deciding whether to enter an agreement to arbitrate. It also creates per-
verse incentives for large parties when drafting arbitration agreements. Instead of
encouraging clear arbitration provisions that lay out the agreement in a way both
parties can easily grasp, this judicial shift toward unconscionability encourages
large parties to utilize ever more cunning and sly methods to avoid unenforceabil-
ity.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that judges are still hostile toward arbitration.'7 ' To that
end, state courts have resorted to the expansion of the unconscionability doctrine
beyond its historical bounds in an effort to invalidate arbitration agreements.179
Manfredi represents the revival of this old judicial hostility toward arbitration
agreements in the consumer context in Missouri. The Manfredi decision is just
another in a recent line of cases indicating Missouri courts' hostile attitude toward
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and sadly this attitude does not appear to
be changing any time soon. In Missouri courts' endeavor to protect consumers
against what it considers unfair situations, the judiciary has resurrected the uncon-
scionability doctrine as a way to circumvent the FAA's preemptive effect in arbi-
tration agreements. However, Missouri's approach has led to a conflict with the
174. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996).
175. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,1747 (2011).
176. Id.
177. See Randell, supra note 2, at 194-195 (recognizing an increase in the number of unconscionabil-
ity claims raised in recent years by noting that judges are finding arbitration agreements unconsciona-
ble at a rate twice that of nonarbitration agreements and that twenty years before the article was pub-
lished, judges had found arbitration and nonarbitration agreements unconscionable at approximately
equal rates).
178. Id. at 186 (noting that federal and state judges maintain some level of judicial hostility concern-
ing arbitration, and that they have enlarged the unconscionability doctrine past its normal uses in an
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United States Supreme Court's stated preference for arbitrability. Whether this
trend will continue is yet to be seen, but if the Manfredi decision is any indication,
this misguided trend is here to stay.
VALERIE DIXON
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